Ukraine: a planned crisis?

(Eurasian Youth Union´s rally.)

Wars, conflicts, mass demonstratios, all this occurs always with some planning behind or at least with some sort of stimulus or "push" that triggers the desired effects.

In August 2014, already during the ongoing war in Ukraine, professor Anton Shekhovtsov published in his blog comparative photos of Eurasian Youth Union´s members between the years 2006 and 2014. The photos taken in 2006 show five members of this movement at a summer camp for indoctrination and training of ultra-nationalist cadres. According to Shekhovtsov, these members should actively fight against democratic movements, a reference to the so-called "Colored Revolutions" that took place in countries neighboring to Russia in 2004 and 2005. The 2014 photos show, one by one, the members of the Union occupying key posts in the administration of the self-proclamed "Donetsk People´s Republic", a region dominated by the pro-Russian fighters that claims for autonomy in eastern Ukraine. Bellow are two of the examples identified by Shekhovtsov.

               

(Andrei Purgin, leader of the Donetsk Republic organization at the camp in 2006, and as Prime Minister of the "Donetsk People´s Republic" in 2014.)

            

(Oksana Shkoda, at the Union´s camp in 2006, and as representative of the "Donetsk People´s Republic´s" headquarter in 2014.)

The Union was founded in 2005 by the Russian ideologist Alexander Dugin and then deputy head of the presidencial administration Vladimir Surkov. The Eurasian Youth Union Party Program outlines guidelines to be followed by it´s members. Firstly, it points to the US as the great enemy to sorround and penetrate Russia with the spread of it´s financial, plutocratic tiranny and moral degeneration. Then, the program proclaims the so-called "Great Cleansing", an era of fighting to nation´s alleged traitors that hold key positions in media, bureaucracy, and to fight againts conformism for the construction of Greater Russia. In order to carry out this revolution, the program establishes the creation of an Eurasian Army and seeks to boost the Eurasian pride by highlighting the supposed virtues of the Eurasia´s people, and promise to honor the values inherited by their ancestors. Finally, it promises to fulfill it´s destiny, to realize the Eurasian Revolution and to establish the Eurasian Empire, whose members would live the highest virtues of honor and glory, claims for the creation of a country with a "joyous" and "merciless" people and invite the young to get thogether in the "Eurasian collective", which is the Youth Union. All the party program is based on Dugin´s thought, which references are clear in it´s language, the enemies to be fought (US and the Western financial elites) and in the promise to rescue and protect the Eurasia´s peoples cultures.

(Vladimir Surkov with Vladimir Putin in 2006)

Those who follow this blog probably have an general idea of who Alexander Dugin is, but maybe don´t know Vladimir Surkov. Surkov was Russian deputy prime minister and assistant to the Russian president in international affairs, and it´s considered one of the architects of Russia today. He defines himself as "one of the actors of the Russian system", is nicknamed "political technologist of all Rus [Russia]" and presents himself as firm West´s opponent. As deputy head of the administration, Surkov met with Russian journalists and determined what should and should not be said and appear in country´s televisions, as well as encouraged the media to present the Kremlin as a stable and reliable power. Among other activities, he published literary works exposing the double character of Russian public moral, characteristic heritage of the Soviet period and of which Surkov is a representative.

(Konstantin Malofeev)

Another member who would be also involved in Ukraine crisis is the oligarch Konstantin Malofeev. He´s accused by Western leaders of financing the pro-Russian fighters in the neighboring country, and is on the list of economic sanctions of Canada and European Union, which he considers "much stupid" and unable to affect his business. Maloffev is head of the investments firm Marshall Capital and is described in the Western media as "Putin´s Soros", in allusion to his financial support for Kremlin projects, and as "God´s oligarch", a reference to his commitment to promoting Orthodox Christian values and the restauration of glory of the former Russian Empire. Among his actions are the funding to the World Congress of Families, to the dissemination of traditional values (i.e. Orthodox) through his St. Basil the Great Foundation, the law against homossexual propaganda to minors in Russia, the internet control and the rebels in Ukraine.

(Strelkov, Malofeev and Dugin in a meeting recorded in vídeo in na unidentified location.)

The conection between Malofeev an the Kremlin circle is narrow. On his list of contacts are the former Russian Minister of Communications Igor Shchyogolev, the head of state Russian Railways Vladimir Yakunin, the likely Vladimir Putin´s personal confessor and head of one of the main monasteries in Russia father Tikhon, the political technologist, former Malofeev´s public consultor and former Prime Minister of the self-proclaimed "Donetsk People´s Republic" Alexander Borodai, the member of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia and leader of the pro-Russian rebels in Ukraine Igor Girkin (known as Igor Strelkov) and Alexander Dugin.

Marshall Capital provides funding to the St. Basil Foundation. In this company, Igor Strelkov would have worked years ago, information denied by the oligarch. Strelkov also appears in the economic sanctions imposed by the US and European Union.

Malofeev, Strelkov and Borodai probably form a close relationship. In a trip to Ukraine that would have aimed the exposure of Orthodox relics, Malofeev visited Kiev and had his protection provided by Strelkov, who is also a Borodai´s friend.

(Igor Girkin - or Strelkov - military leader of the pro-Russian fighters in Ukraine.)

The oligarch doesn´t spare praise to Strelkov, whom calls "a man of ideals". He also says that for his actions in Ukraine Strelkov would be a "real hero". "He´s got the spirit of a Russian officer. As someone loves the Russian Empire, I can only sympathize with him." Dugin also shed many praises and exalt Strelkov´s figure, whom he describes as "the Russian myth" presenting him as model of the "ideal" Russian man, the one who embodies the nation´s identity. He would be the "bearer of the Russian archetype". "He´s us", says Dugin, the right man to fight with hatred the spiritual enemy, a reference to the men who embody the Western way of life. Both Malofeev´s and Dugin´s statements suggest that both have a good knowledge of who Strelkov is, and who is openly supported by them.

The relationships network that brings Dugin, Malofeev, Strelkov and Surkov to the conflict in Ukraine is complex. Their role indicates that the Russian government delegates to members of it´s relationship circle the responsability to act in Ukraine, avoiding the accusation that Moscow would be acting directly in it´s territory. This is the stratagem used by Putin to repeatedly state that Russia isn´t intervening in the neighbouring country, what amounts to say that a gang didn´t invade a house because it delegated to the other gang the assault in an agreement signed by both parts.

Given the size of the Russian network linked to the Kremlin that´s operating in Ukraine, it´s higly unlikely it have been created in the period between the overthrow of President Viktor Yanukovich, on February 22nd 2014, and the beginning of the Crimean invasion by Russian military forces from the port city of Sevastopol four days later. It not only existed before, like the Eurasian Youth Union´s summer camp, as people like Strelkov were already active in military, an activity without which would be impossible to lead an armed militia. Most important of all, however, it´s the Neo-Eurasian ideology that moves groups such as the Union, the International Eurasian Movement and a number of representatives of politics, the Armed Forces and the media. The ideals of restauration of the former Russian emperial power, as openly supported by the various Konstantin Malofeev´s projects, are perfect tools for the expanstionist program of the Eurasian movement. The oligarch sees the conflict in Ukraine as a war in a cultural context. Culture is seen by the Dugin´s Neo-Eurasian movement as one of the fundations for the formation of civilizations and, hence, of their political forces. For Malofeev there are no differences between Russians and Ukrainians. Both don´t form distinct people, but only one, an idea also shared by the Eurasianists.

It should be noted that the Ukraine´s people and territory are crucial for the creation of Greater Russia and the Eurasian Empire idealized by Dugin, the fighters in Ukraine, the Kremlin´s oligarchs and put into practice by Putin. Judging by the Eurasian Movement´s principles, Moscow won´t rest until its has carried out it´s plans in Ukraine and, thence, to the rest of the world. The fight is much deeper than the economic sanctions imposed by the West to some members of the Russian power. It pass through the conquest of hearts and minds and the bodies movement into the battlefield.

* Published in Portuguese on July 15th 2015.

Martyrs, heroes and others not so saints: the construction of the new Russian identity

(Town of Kaluga, Russia)

The anthropologist and professor at the New Bulgarian University, Milena Benovska-Sabkova, has carried out a work on memory policy implemented in Russia in the religious revival context. Her activity had as reference the city of Kaluga, with 350 thousand inhabitans 150 km southwest Moscow, and has been published in various academical journals (here - page 95-98, here and, most complete, here).

With the end of the Soviet Union, a series of research began in order to reconstitut and rebuild the religious communities, churches and monasteries destroyed in Russia. Much of this work was done by so-called kraevedenie, researchers specializing in local history as cultural heritage, biographies and origins of families. Such a kind of researcher has emerged still in the time of the Soviet Union and actually has a semi-official status, acting independently and also with research centers, schools, churches and local authorities. Within this branche there are the church kraevedenie, who makes the same work, but focused especifically on religious matters, with emphasis on survey of demolished churches, research on religious files and biographical survey of clerics and religious people, especially those who desappeared in the Communist era.

Since 2000, with the Vladimir Putin´s arrival to Presidency of Russia, the activity of the kraevedenie has has gained great official stimulus: they were co-optated by the authorities to work in rescue research of Russian history acting in schools, museums and in local activties such as congresses and books launches. Thus, these reasearchers began to form a semiprofissional group related a) to the national project of memory policy, b) to the regional projects linked to the memory policy at national level, and c) to the spontaneous research acitvity carried out by their members. The church kraevedenie also entered this process, and began to work close to the Russian Orthodox Church´s authorities. Thus, they consolidated the role as intermediaries between the Orthodox clergy and the common citizen making a knowledge "bridge" between the two social groups.

(Optina Pustyn Monastery, in the town of Koselsk 60 km from Kaluga. Founded in the 15th century, the monastery is one of the main ones in Russia and also region´s religious center. It was transformed by the Bolsheviks in the Kraevedenie Museum in 1917-29, and later received a department of a Koselk´s museum in 1957.)

It´s through the close relationship between the kraevedenie and the Russian Orthodox Church that the religious revival takes place in Russia. They work together both at national level in the Synodal Commission of Canonization of Saints and at regional level, following the example of the Commission of Canonization of the Eparchy of Kaluga, where the anthropologist Milena carried out her research. Therefore, these researchers not only rescue the Orthodoxy´s past memory but also integrate the Church´s plan to reconstitute a national religious identity.

Since 1989, the Orthodox Church has carried out a series of canonizations, among them the confessors and "new martyrs", that is, the religious assassinated or dead during the communist regime. The church kraevedenie are of fundament importance mainly for rescuing files, survivors´ memories and to discover abandoned cemiteries in the old churches. Along them work the so-called "religious entrepreneurs" who commit some of their time and personal resources to carry out and organize religious processions, restore icons, restore and rebuild destroyed churchers and create the so-called "sacred places" for visitation, as the new memorial designed in Kaluga for the veneration of the new martyrs.

The memory policy in Russia also seeks to rehabilitate the civilians and militaries´ memory, especially soldiers killed in World War II. The so-called "Great Patriotic War" is considered, as Angelo Segrillo in the book "Os Russos" ("The Russians") comments, a moment of great trauma, meaning practically a refoundation of the country. It´s estimated that seven thousand cities have been destroyed and up to 27 million people have died in this event, of which 100 thousand only in the small district of Kaluga.

The kraevedenie are also involved in this secular historical rescue, mainly in the discovery and cataloging of the collective graves, activity that involves mainly military groups and war veterans. Milena comments that it´s through the indentification of the dead and a new decent funeral that there´s a "sacralization" of the soldiers, seen as heroes, civil "martyrs" of Russia. "The anonymous dead", the anthropologist says, "are transformed into heroes via personalization and 'proper burial'" (p. 20)

The new martyrs canonization and mainly the national heroes identification serve as a way of dealing with the traumatic past, not only of war but also of anti-religious persecution. Some of the kraevedenie who formed their academical life during the Soviet Union today have to deal with KGB´s files, where many of the crimes commited against religious people as murders, arrests and persecution are documented. The seemingly irreconcilable legacy of Communist terror against religious and ornidary citizens is transformed in a "positive" past through the heroes veneration and the martyrs canonization.

(Cathedral of Christ the Saviour, in Moscow, Russian Orthodox Church´s headquartes. It was destroyed by the Bolsheviks at the behest of Stalin´s, in 1931, and rebuild from 1990 during Yeltsin government. It was consacreated on August 19th 2000.) 

 

In the current Vladimir Putin administration (2013-2018), there´s a clear attempt by the Kremlin to approach and ideologically instrumentalize the discourses of the Orthodox Church´s upper clergy on the country´s history. This instrumentalization, that appears on Putin´s public statements, fosters the idea of Russia as a civilization distinct from the others, unique and origial, in opposition to the West. It would be through the return to it´s cultural roots and the rescue of the tradition that Russia could fulfill it´s role as power which is destined to be. Thus, all Russian history, including the Communist period, is considered "sacred" and necessary as part of an unique experience of a people distinct from the others. In Putin´s own words:

"Many people argue about the Lenin’s Tomb, saying that it does not follow tradition. What does not follow tradition? Just visit Kiev’s Pechersk Lavra or go to Pskov Monastery, or Mount Athos. You will see hallows of holy people there. Go ahead, you can see it all there. Therefore, the communists continued the tradition even in that respect and did it competently, in accordance with the demands of those times."

(Military parade in Moscow on Victory Day, celebrated on May 9th: Communist period rehabilitated as part of the Russia´s "sacred" history.)

It´s possible to see clearly in the Putin´s statement the memory policy carried out in his administration. This is why the official stimulus of a historical rescue and a value transformation of the Communist period, from where the Russia´s new martyrs and heroes were rescued. This policy covers part of the Russian Orthodox Church´s upper clergy, as well as Orthodox leaders and faithful called "fundamentalists" and nationalist groups. These last two nourish an extreme rejection to all the Western influences and demand canonization of proeminent civilian figures in the Russian history, includind the dictator Josef Stalin. The researcher Igor Torbakov of the Uppsala University, in Sweden, comments on this Russian government´s attemp of synthesizing the contradictions of the Russian history into a single narrative:

"In Frederick Corney’s words, 'Putin was offering a narrative of modern Russian history in which the turbulences of Russia’s past served merely as a backdrop to recent progress, an offer of reconciliation without truth.' [author´s highlight] As its support base consists of a broad coalition comprising heterogeneous social groups, the regime, in its quest for historical legitimacy, seeks to synthesize disparate elements of Russia’s different 'pasts' into a kind of eclectic fusion. 'It attempts to yoke, if uncomfortably, various idealized aspects of the tsarist, soviet and émigré pasts' and present this concoction as 'history without guilt or pain.'

The search for an indivisible truth, the fascination with the irrational, the hope to find a special path, a destiny, a mission granted by God and/or History are current discourses among Russian intellectuals in the post-Soviet era, amalgamating all events and ideological branches into a single body. Nothing more exemplary of this characteristics than Alexander Dugin´s Neo-Eurasian though, so often mentioned in this blog, or the extremely heterogenous composition of members and groups linked to the Putin´s United Russia Party.

Russia seeks for an absolute unity, a totality that unifies everything and everyone in a new national identity. The Moscow´s memory policy is one aspect of the attempt to rescue or create a new Russian identity unifying successes and traumas, heroes and martyrs, crimes and holiness acts and "saints" of all specters of  Russian society, even if they arent´s so saint thus.

* Published in Portugues on April 13th 2016.