Sanctions, NATO, Olympics and murder: ingredients of worsening relations between Russia and the West

(West and Russia: little friends.)

The last few weeks have been marked by increased tension between Russia and the West. From NATO to the Olympics, political, economic and military differences have placed Russians and the Weste on opposite sides and worsened the Moscow´s international situation.

I don´t intend to deepen the following facts, but give an overview of how recent events can affect the Russia´s relationship with the West and contribute to the understanding of the political climate sorrouding this relation.

(European Union renowed for another six months the economic sanctions against Russia. Red signal to the Kremlin.) 

On June 15th the European Union renewed for another six months the economic sanctions against Russia for it´s role in the conflict in Ukraine. The measure affect politics and economy personalities and Russian investiments in the continent and are valid until January 31st 2017. Nothing new in this regard since renovation was already expected. On response, Russia announced apply the principle of reciprocity and will impose sanctions to food imports from Europe. There is a lack of perspective for sanctions suspension.

(Lawmakers in the Cyprus´ Senate in the capital, Nicosia: country of Orthodox traditions with historical relations with Russia.)

On the other hand there are moves in some coutries to question the sanctions effectiveness and pressure the European Union to suspend them. Such questions start from Euroceptics and/or pro-Russia groups. One in Cyprus. On July 7th it´s Parliament called for the end of the sanctions saying they undermined trade between the two countries, were counterproductive, "unacceptable" and that the targets were friendly people of the country. Italy also has positioned against the sanctions renewal. The resolution was adopted on June 27th by the Senate at the request of Northern League, party with close links with the Kremlin (the League also urged to Senate officially recognize Crimeia as Russian territory, but this resolution was denied). Two other pro-Russia parties, Five Stars and Fuerza Itália, also supported the resolution. And a few weeks ago Italian regional governments has called for sanctions suspension. Another country that take the same measure was Greece, whose Alexis Tsipras government, the Syriza leftist coalition, has systematically opposed to the sanctions against Russia. During a visit by Putin to the country in late May, Tsipras declared once again be firmly against such sanctions. Syriza rules Greece along with the far-right party Independent Greeks, also pro-Russia. Member of both parties have close links with the Kremlin, as already mentioned in this blog.

(NATO meeting logo in Warsaw with the members countries´ flags.)

On July 8 and 9th was held in Warsaw, Poland, the meeting of the NATO countries. The members released a joint statement where say that "the Euro-Atlantic community is facing unprecedented challenges emanating from the South and East", establish agreements between the organization and the European Union to speed up the preparations of the continent´s defense and improve the exchange of informations and know how for a hybrid war. The references to the "South" and "East" are, respectively, North of Africa/Middle East and Russia, and the mention of "hybrid war" is a response to the Kremlin´s strategy of penetration into Europe through desinformation campaign, internet activism, secret service role and, in the case os Islamic extremism, terrorism. Another point of great importance was the formal approval of sending more alliance troops to Eastern Europe. A total of four thousand soldiers (one thousand in each battalion) will be allocated in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and Poland, Russia´s neighbouring countries. Despite these troops are not enough to contain a Russian invasion they are a clear message to the Moscow´s behavior, who since the annexation of Crimeia in 2014 and the infiltration of soldiers who started a war in Ukraine, has become too much more provocative.

(Vladimir Putin with the Finnish Prime Minister, Salui Niinisto: the Russian president was clear of what he thinks about a possible Finland integration to NATO.) 

A week before the NATO meeting, Vladimir Putin was in Finland where he met with country´s Prime Minister, Salui Niinisto. Given the recent tensions involving the invasion of the aerialspace in the Baltic Sea region countries by Russian aircrafts and the NATO military exercices in Poland, Finland has taken into account it´s entry into the organization. Putin said enjoy the Finnish military neutrality, but that it´s entry into the NATO would cause a response from Russia suggesting that would relocate it´s military forces on the border of two countries. The declaration was a clear message of irritation that recent aliance military moves cause in the Kremlin, and was seen by some Western media as a threat. Although Finland is militarily neutral, with the Warsaw meeting the country passed to have (as well as Sweden, another neutral country) a permanent seat for talks within the organization. If in the future the Finns move into the group, Russia will have another border (this time extensive, with 1340 km) with adversary troops. The NATO troops movement next to Russia is a nuisance factor and a challenge for Moscow, which see the need to respond to the height of the Western military presence.

(Two-time Olympic champion in Athens and Beijing, three-time world champion and four-times indoor world champion in pole vault: for Yelena Isimbayeva the bannishement of Russian athletes from track and field is the sport "funeral" and "a blatant political order".)

In sports Russia also had losses. On June 17th, International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) banned the Russian track and field athletes from Olympics 2016 in Rio de Janeiro on charge that many of them used banned substances to improve sports performance. Such uses were sistematic and were part of an doping policy state-sponsored. According to the report published by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) there were many frauds in the collection for analysis: many of them were cancelled or rejected, others were lost and urine samples were exchanged. In the later case the work would have been done by the Russian secret servisse. The ban follows the punishment suffered by the same athletes in November 2015. At the time they were suspended from all international competition due the same scandal. Investigations showed that frauds in anti-doping tests had been widespread.

The Russian Olympic Commettee (ROC) and other 68 athletes attempted to overturn the ban for the Rio Games, but so far without success. The International Olympic Commettee (COI) said that the Russian athletes could compete if they proved were clean of prohibited substances, and that their presence in the games should be under neutral flag. On July 25th, another seven Russian athletes, this time from synchronized swimming, were also banned by the International Swimming Federation (FINA, in French).

(The Moscow Olympics, in 1980, had the American boycott in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: sports and politics were never fully separeted. The Soviets responder boycotting the Los Angeles Games four years later.) 

All-Russia Athletic Federation (ARAF) and some Russian authorities oscilated between defensive and prosecution. Vladimir Putin and Sergei Lavrov asked the sports issue was not politicized. But Lavrov complained to John Kerry the US interference on punishment of their athletes and accused American ask, through a letter to the COI by their anti-doping agency (USADA), the banishment of all the Russian delegation. The Minister called this act "provocative anti-Russian demands". Putin suspended his Sports Deputy Minister, Igor Upland, and all the names mentioned in the WADA report, but defended the Minister Vitaly Mutko, longtime political ally, and questioned what would be the reason for the US anti-doping agency and other countries ask soo hastily, based on the WADA report, the suspension of all the Russian delegation. For this part, Mutko asked that the accusation against him was "absolutely unreal and impossible".

The Lavrov and Putin´s defensives suggest, on the one hand, the widespread doping scandal is real; for the other hand criticism of anti-doping organizations in other countries suggest a political motive for the Russian athletes ban. Real or not, this attitude transfers in some extent the meaning of the ban from sports sphere to international politics. It´s an ingredient in bad relations between Russians and the West. Although the IOC is global, the international organizations are seen by the Kremlin as political tools of the West, specifically the US, and the banishment of Russian athletics of Olympics would be a political provocation. The Americans boycott to the Moscow Games in 1980 in response to the Afghanistan Soviet invasion (1978-1988) and the Soviet boycott response to the Los Angeles Games in 1984 show that sport works, too, as a international pressure instrument. If confirmed the ban on Russians for the Rio Olympics it will be the first time that a large number of athletes (more than a hundred) stay out of the competition since 1984 por doping or political reasons, and will be the third time that this kind of crisis involves the Russians.

(Pavel Shemeret and the car he was after the explosion in Kiev, on July 20th: political instability in Ukraine.)

On July 20th was murdered in Ukraine the journalist Pavel Sheremet. Although died at 44, his career was intense: born in Belarus, he was harsh critic of Alexander Lukashenko government. He was arrested in 1997 while crossing the border from Lithuania during recording for a Russian TV being accused of "receiving money from foreign agencies" and for "illegal journalistic activities". He was released early 1998. In 1999 he moved to Russia, where acquired citizenship the following year. There he was also a journalist opponent of Putin, but his situation got more difficult when Crimeia was annexed in 2014, of which became a strong critic. He openly accused Russia of illegaly annex the peninsula and support separatists in eastern Ukraine. In the same year Sheremet left the TV where he worked, Channel One, in protest to the Russian government action in the media, and moved to Kiev. There he was murdered.

The car he was exploded in city´s downtown shortly before 8 am as he went to the work. The vehicle´s owner was his wife, Olena Prytula, journalist and newspaper´s former editor where both worked, Ukrayinska Pravda. The newspaper, founded in 1990, has a history of opposition to the Ukranian government. One of it´s founders, Georgiy Gongadze, who at the time was close to Prytula, was kidnapped and beheaded in 2000 during the Leonid Kuchma government. The case had considerable repercution and helped to precipitate the "Orange Revolution" in 2004 which brought to power the Kuchma´s opponent, Viktor Yushchenko. Sheremet was Boris Nemtsov´s friend, one of the main Putin´s opponents in Russia, and became one of almost twenty journalists murdered in the country since it´s independence in 1991. A Ministry of Internal Affairs´ spokesman said it couldn´t be rouled out the possible involvement of the Russian secret service in the murder. Another suspicion was that the target was Prytula, since the bomb was put in her car. The Sheremet´s recent work addressed, too, the corruption in Poroshenko government and the pro-Ukraine Azov Battalion´s role and lead by the extermist Right Sector. Poroshenko described the muder as "tragedy" and said that he knew personally the journalist.

(The murdered Russian politician Boris Nemtsov beside Sheremet to the microphone.) 

It´s not possible to say who ordered the Sheremet´s death. From availabe informations it can make hypotheses. And many. Since the pro-Ukraine battalion to Russia´s secret service, a member of the Ukranian government to Belarus government, any of these groups or members may have connection with the murder. Journalists and opponents of the Russian and Belarussian governments mourned the Sheremet´s death and recalled his proximity with Nemtsov highlighting the role that both played by revealing the corruption schemes of the establishments of these countries; others compared the journalist´s death with the Alexander Litvinenko´s murder by the FSB in London in 2006. Both comparasion suggest that Sheremet was one more victim of the governments of the former USSR countries. Despite the suspicions of Russian involvement, two things need to be said: first that everything is still speculation, and that the Russia´s involvement is just theory. Second that, as announced some Ukranian authorities, the Sheremet´s murder worsen the political climate in Ukraine and, consequently, favors Moscow which considers illegitimate the Kiev government. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs denounced these analyses as "russophobics".

(Relashionship increasingly difficult.)

The economic sanctions renewal by the European Union against Moscow, the internal pressure of the parties and politicians allies of Russians for the suspension of these sanctions, the new NATO´s strategy towards Russia with troops allocation in the east, the fight in the informations war and a closer relashionship of the organization with Scandinavia point to a higher tension between Russians and the West. In the case of allied parties, the pressure within the European bloc strengthens the need of a reaction to the "hybrid war" promoted by the Kremlin that involves, besides of the propaganda dissemination through the media, network contacts with right-wing and left-wing extremists.

On the other hand the possibility (albeit strongly especulative) that Russia has something to do with the Sheremet´s murder only contributes to increased political tension in the region and a greater destabilization of Ukraine. But the disconfort caused by the Russian athletes banishment at the Rio Olympics demoralizes the country´s authorities to expose them to the world as deeply corrupt and unrialible. In the last two cases the historical precedent of journalists murders in the former USSR countries and the episodes of political retaliation at sporting events contributes to the increase of widespread distrust of Russia.

The request of Russian Minister Sergei Lavrov to the American Secretary of State John Kerry to the doping scandal doesn´t become in another political dispute between the two sides is one more signal that the realpolitik logic invaded all the contact channels between Russia and Western countries. Each event is solved within the problems and discordances framework between both. All care is little.**

* published in Portuguese on July 26 2016.

** "Todo o cuidado é pouco" is an expression in Portuguese that means someone need to take great care in each word, gesture and attitude.

The Kremlin´s hooligan

(Vladimir Putin and Alexander Shprygin (behind) in the tribute on December 21st 2010 to the Moscow Spartak´s fan murdered by a gang from Caucasus.)

The game Russia X England at Euro 2016 was accompained by brawl between Russian and English hooligans before, during and after the match that took place in Marseille, France, on June 11h.

It´s unclear who started the mess. The British and Russian presses have opposite versions of the events, stating (or suggesting) that violence would have started on the opposite side. According to report of English Daily Mail, whose site has many strong violence images, the brawl at Stade Velódrome began after the end of the match when Russian hooligans wearing balaclavas burst into the British area and tore their flags, caunsing fight and big run. But there have been clash in Marseille streets on previous day (10), with many witnesses saying that the Russians gathered in organized groups to create turmoil and played every kind of object present in the streets and some even using knives.

(English hooligans in the brawl in Marseille.)

A report of the Russial newspaper Pravda said that the confusion in the stadium began with political provocations and offenses by the English and that a Russian flag was torn, what it would result in their reactions. That would have been witnessed by two British sport journalists. Another Russian source, Russia Today, citing internet reports, said that Russian and British hooligans would have gathered to confront local fans, most of them "black and Arabs", and that when there was a fight between Russian and British was at initiative of the latter.

At night after the match, fourty French police raded hotel where Russian fans were hosted. The officers would be armed, entered the rooms and registered fans with photos and ID copies.

The violence resulted in a fine of 150 thousand euros to Russia. UEFA threatened with disqualification of Russian and English national teams in Euro if their fans to engange in new brawls. England wasn´t fined.

(Fight at Stade Velódrome, on the match betwenn Russia and England, on June 11th. Apparently Russian are on the left side of the picture going against English on the right.) 



The British highlighted the Russian press coverage. According The Guardian Russian fans were portraited by press as his "heroes" against the violence of the British. The Russian would had been attacked and fought heroically against "hordes" of hooligans, and at some time 250 of theirs supporters repelled the attack of thousands of English. An article in Pravda criticized the Western media for only repeating the French police and UEFA informations (alluding to their anti-Russia position), and has heavely criticized both organizations. It said that police would be unprepared to deal with potential problems in a major sport event that gather violent fans. It suggested that police would have acted fully partially, questioning why not punished the English hooligans who a few days ago caused uproar, why wasn´t capable to handle, for example, illegal imigrants, and why with all this only Russian fans were indiscriminately arrested and deported after violence in Marseille. On UEFA, the article questioned whether organization wouldn´t have received bribe to organize Euro in France, with stadiuns and administration unable to provide security in the event. It still suggested that Footbal Russian Union and other affected should go to European Union´s court, according the author an anti-Russian body. It would be an opportunity to show the organization´s hypocrisy to the world.

The deportation of the Russian from France commented in Pravda isn´t as "partial" as it seems. The event began on June 14th, when a bus with Russian fans went from Marseille to Lille was stopped by police. The vehicle was held up for a day. Of the 43 people detained, 20 were released, 20 were taken to deportation and another three were waiting for Justice. In this bus was the Russian Supporters Union (RSU) delegation, whose leader was Alexander Shprygin, one of the deportees. The deportation of the detainees was on the 17th.

Shprygin isn´t an ordinary fan. He has a long record as cheerleader, political agitator, sporting events organizer and relations with the Kremlin. Dynamo Moscow fan, he´s also founder and leader of the nationalist organization Russian Supporters Union of 2007. He was part of Russian oficial delegation that visited Euro host cities in March this year. At this time local delegations of Toulouse and Marseille refused to receive Shprygin on the grounds that he would have problems with police. He´s also part of local commettee of the World Cup 2018 to the games in Moscow. When travelling to Euro in an chartered flight, six members of RSU delegations had their visas in France denied.

The Fare Network organizaton, linked to UEFA and FIFA and responsable for monitoring discrimination and violence in football fans, says that Shprygin is one of main responsable for introduction of Nazi practices and symbols in the games since 90´s, and that he would be linked to far-right groups, ultranationalists and would have intimate relations to Russian senior politicians. On May Fare would have warned UEFA about the Russian leader accreditation in the organization, which responded already to screen their accredited.

(Igor Lebedev, who gave explicit support to hooligan, is Deputy Speaker of Duma, MP by ultranationalist LDPR and member of Executive Committee of the Russian Football Union. Shprygin is his personal adviser.)

The official relation of Shprygin with international sport organizations is related to his closeness to the Kremlin. He works as Deputy Speaker of Duma advisor. Igor Lebedev is MP for Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) which, despite it´s name, is extreme-nationalist and anti-Western. It has this name since 1991, but was founded in 1989 by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, considered one of the leading representatives of Russian nationalism and known for his extremist positions. LDPR is within the range of groups and movements considered by Western analysts as "ultranationalists" and "far-right".

(Russian Sports Minister, Russian Football Union president and FIFA board member: little moderation.)

Lebedev is member of the Russian Football Union executive commettee. On July 31st 2015 he gave up to run for president of organization to support Vitaly Mutko, now Union president and Russian Sports Minister. Support came in an exchange of favors. After a meeting with both, Lebedev said: "he [Mutko] will back me at the elections to the executive committee and I will support him at the elections of the president." Mutko is part of FIFA´s board and it´s key part in organizing the World Cup 2018.

The proximity of Shprygin to Russia´s official sporting bodies helps to explain (not justify) the undiplomatic reaction of Lebedev and Mutko on violence in Marseille. In the day of the brawl, Lebedev supported hooligans through twitter saying that "the lads defended the honor of their country and did not let English fans desacrete our motherland". Also said that "I don´t see anything wrong with the fans fighting", and completed: "Quite the opposite, well done lads, keep it up!" Mutko was in the game Russia X England and was filmed applausing the Russian fans after the game and brawl. He commented that there wasn´t fight among football fans in the game, that it was an "overkill" and that "ereything was alright". The Minister talked to Shprygin and didn´t say anything about the fight. Only congratulated group for "victory", a possible reference to the brawl at stadium as the game ended tied at 1-1. Later Mutko downplayed the situation and said the violence of some fans was a "disgrace for the country".

Shprygin is also close to Vladimir Putin. In 2010 the cheerleader was photographed along the Russian president in a tribute to a Spartak team´s fan murdered in Moscow. He has also been in meetings cheared by Putin, as in January 2012 when were present then FIFA and UEFA´s presidents, Joseph Blatter and Michel Plattini. It´s not possible to know exactly how close Shprygin and Putin are, but at the cited meeting the president referref to the cheerleader as "Sasha", diminutive of Alexander, suggesting some intimicy between the two.

In adition to the explicit support of Lebedev and the minimizing damage of Mutko, in Russia the reaction to the fans arrests and violence was of criticism to the police action and the alleged bias of the authorities to treat with the Russians. The Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, has heavely criticized the fans arrest saying they were "absolutely unacceptable". He also said that French authorities didn´t informe the embassy or consulate in Marseille that would make interception of the fans bus, and that the informations were known only through social media. Despite admitting the "unacceptable behavior" of some Russian fans, Lavrov criticized the provocative atittude of English, and said that French authorities were willfully ignoring their behavior and expected equal treatment for both groups. The Kremlin´s spokesman, Dmitri Peskov, said he expected for a fair investigation about the clashes in Marseille.

Vladimir Putin, who was at the Economic Forum of Saint Petersburg, criticizes the Russian hooligans, saying the fight with English was a "desgrace" and hoped the law was equally apply to all involved. The president, however, made an ironic comment saying "I truly don´t understand how two hundred of our fans could beat up several thousand English". It was a clear reference to the information disclosed in local press that a few Russians have placed many Englishmen to run.

The repeated emphasis by the Kremlin that the French authorities should give equal treatment to both Russians and other nationalities show the distrust of the country´s leaders on Western politics. The same is valid to the press.

(Spartak Moscow Neonazi hooligans: penetration of extremist movements in Russian football since the 90´s.) 

The sport "culture" which Shprygin is part was commented in a long report by Scottish newspaper Herald Scotland. The Russian hooligans refer themselves as "ultras" and originates from the Moscow and Saint Petersburg football clubs. They are inspired by the period in wich English hooliganism was more active, in 1970´s. They have an ascetic behavior, don´t smoke or drink, practice physical training, group actions tactics and travel to other cities to confront other club´s fans. According to an analyst, they would be almost completely "right-wing", "racist" and "homophobic", and many of them believe they have a duty of defending the Russian traditional values. The ultras also organize the so-called "white wagons", which is violent action against people of "non-Slavic appearance" and ideological opponents within urban subways. Possibly due the proximity of the World Cup 2018 the Russian police has firmly opposed the violence in football clubs and has managed to avoid turmoil in the cities, forcing the hooligans to wage their fights in remote areas.

The report rises the question of existence of relationship between the ultras, extremist groups and the Kremlin, and how the state encourages the actions of such groups. It says there´s no consensus among researchers about the level of Kremlin´s control on hooligans, some saying that among them predominate ordinary people, other saying that they were created by FSB, successor to the KGB secret service.

An expert heard by the Herald explained that Kremlin has a cooptation policy of nationalis groups, including the ultras. He says that the youth group Nashi, created by the government, for example, is composed by fans members of the Moscow teams CSKA and Spartak. But the episode that solidified Kremlin´s relationship with football fans was a protest held on December 11th 2010 in Red Square, in Moscow, bringing together between six and seven thousand people. The trigger was a Spartak´s fan murder two days before in a fight with a gang of Caucasian immigrants. The protest was called by extremist organizations as Movement Against Illegal Immigration, xenophobic group known for publishing the rejection of immigration and organize marches in defense of "white" against "color people". There was clashes with police, attacks on people of non-Slavic appearance and thirty wounded. On 21st, Vladimir Putin was at fan´s grave to lay flowers and pay him tribute. In a speech he pointed that "extremists" were trying to infiltrate the football fans, and urged the fans to "let nobody manipulate you". It was in this tribute that Shprygin appeared alongside Putin.

(Shprygin making Nazi salute with Korrozia Metala band members, in 2001: indicative of his ideological inclinations.) 

Despite some episodes don´t allow definitive conclusions, the Shprygin attitudes give indications about his ideological preferences. In 2001 he was photographed making the Nazi salute alongside members of the Russian heavy metal band Korrozia Metala, which has musics banned in Russia for inciting "ethnic hating". In other situation, he was arrested for almost one year for assaulting the singer of the same band, and still had a two-year sentence suspended by justice. While saying "antifasict" and "have nothing against Jews", the hooligan leader already made statments with racial conotations about the Russian and other countries football teams .

After been deported from France on June 17th, Shprygin took a surprising attitude: quickly returned to the country and was arrested again on 20th. The arrest was reported by the spokesman of Ministry of Interior of France and took place at Toulouse stadium in the match between Russia and Wales.

Shortly before being arrested, Shprygin talked by phone with the French news agency AFP. He said that would have been informed by French authorities that wasn´t deported, but expelled. So his visa in European Union was still valid. He also said that had the tickets to watch the game. The problem was that his ban was valid on French territory. Hence his arrest. To show how returned to France without being barred, Shprygin posted photos on twitter of an European airport that would be Barcelona and said he arrived in the country by land through "an uncommon rout in the evening twilight".

(Shprygin with stylized Russian flag after been released by the French police to be deported by the second time on June 20th.)

Shprygin was soon released following his arrest. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France said that he would be deported out from Toulouse to Paris and then to Moscow. With the defeat to Wales by 3-0, Russia was eliminated from Euro 2016.

Meanwhile, three other Russians were sentenced to more than two years in jail. These are probably three hooligans who were in the RSU bus held on 14th, when 20 were liberated and other 20 deported. The arrest has angered the Russian authorities, who called the French ambassador in Moscow for consultations.

The return of the RNU´s leader to France was a bold gesture and defiance of European laws and, in general, Western, especially when it comes to leadership involved in criminal acts such as the violence in Marseille.

The Shprygin intimacy with the Russian government in clear, and it´s very likely (although it can´t come to conclusions with informations available here) that Russian group soccer fans and hooligans receive direct Kremlin´s support. This support became clear when RNU members went to watch Euro in France with an chartered plane and Shprygin quickly returned, clandestinely, to the country. It´s not possible to know who exactly is financing actions like these, as well as what would be the state or private sectors that support the Russian hooligans. This is beyound the scope of this analysis. Anyway, the close connection with the high-ranking politicians of the Russian government, like direct connection between Shprygin, Lebedev, Mutko and their promixity with Putin strenghtened by preparations for the World Cup 2018, denotes that Russian hooliganism receive, yes, state support.

It´s of utmost irony Putin´s statement in tribute to the Spartak Moscow´s supporter murdered in 2010 when he said that "extremists" were trying to infiltrate in football fans and asked to the fans not leave "handle". It was the Kremlin´s chief asking to care what Kremlin itself was doing. This is very representative of the Russian authorities behavior, who make a double play in society and apply the same strategy in Europe, as in the example of the hooligans action in Marseille.

(Hooligans and the Kemlin: strategy and intimacy.)

Marlène Laruelle, when analyzing the ideological division in the "Russian radical right", says that various groups, although they differ ideologically, have some common ground: defend the Russian national unity based on History, tradition and ethnic and/or racial ties, have an anti-Western sentiment and see the country threated by external and internal forces. These seems to be some of the principles advocated by Russian hooligans in the ideological sphere.

It´s not possible to know if the hooligans actions were deliberately combined with Russian authorities. Anyway, what´s matter are their actual effects. The brawl in Marseille was the opportunity for the Kremlin, with it´s politicians and ministers, claimed the French authorities "equal treatment" for Russians and denounced their allegied bias. The resulting friction was another chapter in the complex political plot which Moscow tries to involve the West, creating political and social tensions in expectation to divide it, throw it against itself and then offer a "solution" to the problem. In this context the Shprygin´s role, consciously or not, is clear. He´s much more than cheerleader: he´s an agent that took the field to put in place the Kremlin´s strategy of dividing to better dominate.

* published in Portuguese on June 22th 2016.

Sanções, OTAN, Olimpíadas e assassinato: ingredientes da piora nas relações entre a Rússia e o Ocidente

(Ocidente e Rússia: pouco amigos.)

As últimas semanas foram marcadas por um aumento da tensão entre a Rússia e o Ocidente. Da OTAN às Olimpíadas, divergências de ordem política, econômica e militar têm colocado russos e ocidentais de lados opostos e piorado a situação internacional de Moscou.

Não pretendo aprofundar os fatos a seguir, mas dar um panorama geral de como os últimos eventos podem afetar a relação da Rússia com o Ocidente e contribuir para a compreensão do clima político que envolve esta relação.

(União Europeia renovou por mais seis meses as sanções econômicas contra a Rússia. Sinal vermelho para o Kremlin.)

Em 15 de junho União Europeia renovou por mais seis meses as sanções econômicas contra a Rússia por sua atuação no conflito na Ucrânia. A medida afeta personalidades da política e da economia e investimentos russos no continente e são válidas até 31 de janeiro de 2017. Nada de novo neste aspecto já que a renovação era esperada. Como resposta, a Rússia anunciou aplicar o princípio de reciprocidade e irá impor sanções à importação de alimentos da Europa. Há uma falta de perspectiva de suspensão das sanções.

(Legisladores no senado de Chipre na capital, Nicósia: país de tradição ortodoxa de históricas relações com a Rússia.)

Em compensação há movimentos dentro de alguns países que questionam a eficácia das sanções e pressionam a União Europeia para suspendê-las. Tais questionamentos partem de grupos eurocéticos e/ou pró-Rússia. Um deles é Chipre. Em 7 de julho seu parlamento pediu o fim das sanções dizendo que elas prejudicavam o comércio entre os dois países, eram contraproducentes, "inaceitáveis" e que os alvos das sanções eram pessoas amigas do país. A Itália também posicionou-se contra a renovação das sanções. A resolução foi adotada em 27 de junho pelo senado à pedido da Liga Norte, partido de estreitas ligações com o Kremlin (a Liga também pediu que o senado reconhecesse oficialmente a Crimeia como território russo, mas esta resolução foi negada). Outros dois partidos pró-Rússia, Cinco Estrelas e Força Itália, também apoiaram a resolução. E há algumas semanas governos regionais italianos têm pedido a suspensão das sanções. Outro país que tomou a mesma medida foi a Grécia, cujo governo de Alexis Tsipras, da coalização esquerdista Syriza, têm se oposto sistematicamente às sanções contra a Rússia. Durante uma visita de Putin ao país no final de maio, Tsipras declarou mais uma vez ser firmemente contra tais sanções. O Syriza governa a Grécia junto com o partido de extrema-direita Gregos Independentes, também pró-Rússia. Membros de ambos partidos possuem estreitas ligações com o Kremlin, como já comentado neste blog.

(Logotipo do encontro da OTAN em Varsóvia com as bandeiras dos países membros.)

Em 8 e 9 de julho foi realizado em Varsóvia, na Polônia, o encontro dos países da OTAN. Os membros divulgaram uma declaração conjunta onde afirmam que a "a comunidade Euro-Atlântica está encarando desafios sem precedentes emanando do sul e do leste", estabelecem acordos entre a organização e a União Europeia para agilizar os preparativos da defesa do continente e melhoram a troca de informações e know how para uma guerra híbrida. As referências ao "sul" e "leste" são, respectivamente, norte da África/Oriente Médio e Rússia, e a menção à "guerra híbrida" é uma resposta à estratégia do Kremlin de penetração na Europa através de campanhas de desinformação, ativismo na internet, atução do serviço secreto e, no caso do extremismo islâmico, o terrorismo. Outro ponto de grande importância foi a aprovação formal do envio de mais tropas da aliança para o Leste Europeu. Um total de quatro mil soldados (mil em cada batalhão) serão alocados na Estônia, Letônia e Lituânia, além do oeste da Polônia, países vizinhos à Rússia. Apesar destas tropas não serem o suficiente para conter uma invasão russa elas são uma clara mensagem ao comportamento de Moscou, que, desde a anexação da Crimeia em 2014 e a infiltração de soldados que deram início a uma guerra na Ucrânia, tem se tornado muito mais provocativo.

(Vladimir Putin com o primeiro-ministro finlandês, Salui Niinisto: o presidente russo foi claro no que pensa sobre uma possível integração da Finlândia à OTAN.)

Uma semana antes da reunião da OTAN, Vladimir Putin esteve na Finlândia onde se encontrou com o primeiro-ministro do país, Salui Niinisto. Tendo em vista as recentes tensões envolvendo a invasão do espaço aéreo dos países na região do Mar Báltico por aviões russos e os exercícios militares da OTAN na Polônia, a Finlândia tem levado em consideração sua entrada na organização. Putin disse apreciar a neutralidade militar finlandesa, mas que sua entrada na OTAN causaria uma resposta da Rússia sugerindo que realocaria suas forças militares junto à fronteira dos dois países. A declaração foi uma mensagem clara da irritação que os recentes movimentos militares da aliança causam no Kremlin, e foi entendida por alguns meios de comunicação ocidentais como uma ameaça. Apesar da Finlândia ser militarmente neutra, com o encontro de Varsóvia o país passou a ter (assim como a Suécia, outro país neutro) uma cadeira permanente para conversações dentro da organização. Caso no futuro os finlandeses passem a integrar o grupo, a Rússia terá mais uma fronteira (desta vez extensa, com 1340 km) com tropas militares adversárias. O movimento de tropas da OTAN junto à Rússia é um fator incômodo e um desafio à Moscou, que vê a necessidade de responder à altura da presença militar ocidental.

(Bicampeã olímpica em Atenas e Pequim, tricampeã mundial e tetracampeã mundial indoor no salto com vara: para Yelena Isinbayeva o banimento dos russos do atletismo é o "funeral" do esporte e "uma evidente ordem política".) 

Nos esportes a Rússia também teve prejuízos. No dia 17 de junho, a Associação Internacional das Federações de Atletismo (IAAF, sigla em inglês) baniu os atletas russos do atletismo das Olimpíadas de 2016 no Rio de Janeiro sob acusação de que muitos deles utilizavam substâncias proibidas para melhorar o desempenho esportivo. Tais usos eram sistemáticos e faziam parte de uma política de dopagem apoiada pelo Estado. Segundo o relatório publicado pela Agência Mundial Anti-Doping (WADA) houve muitas fraudes na coleta para análise: muitas delas foram canceladas ou recusadas, outras foram perdidos e amostras de urina foram trocadas. Neste últimos caso o trabalho teria sido feito pelo serviço secreto russo. O banimento vem na sequência da punição sofrida pelos mesmos atletas em novembro de 2015. Na ocasião ele foram suspensos de todas as competições internacionais devido ao mesmo escândalo. As investigações apontaram que as fraudes nos testes anti-doping haviam sido generalizadas.

O Comitê Olímpico Russo (ROC) e outros 68 atletas tentaram reverter o banimento para os Jogos do Rio, mas até o momento sem sucesso. O Comitê Olímpico Internacional (COI) disse que os atletas russos poderiam competir caso provassem que estavam limpos do uso de substâncias proibidas, e que sua presença nos jogos seria sob bandeira neutra. No dia 25 de julho, outros sete atletas russos, desta vez do nado sincronizado, também foram banidos pela Federação Internacional de Natação (FINA, sigla em francês).

(As Olimpíadas de Moscou, em 1980, teve boicote norte-americano em resposta à invasão soviética do Afeganistão: esporte e política nunca estiveram totalmente separados. Soviéticos responderam boicotando os jogos de Los Angeles quatro anos mais tarde.)

A Federação Atlética de Toda a Rússia (ARAF) e algumas autoridades russas oscilaram entre a defensiva e a acusação. Vladimir Putin e Sergey Lavrov pediram que a questão esportiva não fosse politizada. Porém, Lavrov reclamou com John Kerry a interferência dos EUA no banimento de seus atletas e acusou os americanos de pedirem, através de uma carta enviada ao COI por sua agência anti-doping (USADA), o banimento de toda a delegação russa. O ministro chamou este ato de "demandas provocativas antirrussas". Já Putin suspendeu o vice-ministro dos esportes, Igor Upland, e todos os nomes citados no relatório da WADA, mas defendeu o ministro Vitaly Mutko, aliado político de longa data, e questionou qual seria a razão para que a agência anti-doping dos EUA e demais países pedissem tão apressadamente, com base no relatório da WADA, a suspensão de toda a delegação russa. Por sua parte, Mutko respondeu que a acusação contra ele era "absolutamente irreal e impossível"

As defensivas de Lavrov e Putin sugerem, por um lado, que o escândalo de doping generalizado é real; por outro lado as críticas às organizações anti-doping de outros países sugerem uma motivação política para o banimento dos atletas russos. Real ou não, esta atitude transfere em alguma medida o significado do banimento da esfera esportiva para a política internacional. É mais um ingrediente nas más relações entre russos e ocidentais. Apesar do COI ser uma organização mundial, os organismos internacionais são vistos pelo Kremlin como instrumentos políticos do Ocidente, mais especificamente dos EUA, e o banimento do atletismo russo das Olimpíadas seria mais uma provocação política. O boicote dos americanos às Olimpíadas de 1980 em Moscou em resposta à invasão soviética do Afeganistão (1978-1988) e a resposta soviética de boicote às Olimpíadas de 1984 em Los Angeles mostram que o esporte funciona, também, como instrumento de pressão internacional. Caso se confirme o banimento dos russos para as Olimpíadas do Rio, será a primeira vez que um grande número de atletas (mais de cem) fica de fora da competição desde 1984 por razões de doping ou políticas, e será a terceira vez que uma crise deste tipo envolve os russos.

(Pavel Sheremet e o carro em que estava após a explosão em Kiev, no dia 20 de julho: instabilidade política na Ucrânia.)

Em 20 de julho foi assassinado na Ucrânia o jornalista Pavel Sheremet. Apesar de falecido aos 44 anos, sua carreira foi intensa: nascido na Bielorrússia, era duro crítico do governo de Alexander Lukashenko. Foi preso em 1997 enquanto atravessava a fronteira vindo da Lituânia durante a gravação para uma TV russa sendo acusado de "receber dinheiro de agências estrangeiras" e por "atividade jornalística ilegal". Foi libertado no início de 1998. Em 1999 mudou-se para a Rússia, onde adquiriu cidadania no ano seguinte. Lá também foi um jornalista crítico de Putin, mas sua situação ficou mais difícil quando da anexação da Crimeia em 2014, do qual se tornou forte crítico. Ele acusou abertamente a Rússia de anexar ilegalmente a península e de apoiar os separatistas no leste ucraniano. Neste mesmo ano Sheremet saiu da TV onde trabalhava, ORT, em protesto à atuação do governo russo na mídia, e mudou-se para Kiev. Lá acabou assassinado.

O carro em que estava explodiu no centro da cidade enquanto ia ao trabalho pouco antes das 8 h da manhã. A dona do veículo era sua mulher, Olena Prytula, jornalista e ex-editora do jornal em que ambos trabalhavam, Ukrayinska Pravda. O jornal, fundado em 1990, tem um histórico de oposição ao governo ucraniano. Um de seus fundadores, Georgiy Gongadze, que na época era próximo de Prytula, foi sequestrado e decapitado em 2000 durante o governo de Leonid Kuchma. O caso teve grande repercussão e ajudou a precipitar a "Revolução Laranja" em 2004 que levou ao poder opositor de Kuchma, Viktor Yuschenko. Sheremet era amigo de Boris Nemtsov, um dos principais opositores de Putin na Rússia, e tornou-se mais um dos quase vinte jornalistas assassinados no país desde sua independência em 1991. Uma assessora do Ministério do Interior da Ucrânia afirmou que não poderia ser excluído o possível envolvimento do serviço secreto russo no assassinato. Outra suspeita era de que o alvo era Prytula, já que a bomba fora plantada em seu carro. O trabalho recente de Sheremet versava, também, sobre a corrupção do governo de Poroshenko e a atuação do pró-Ucrânia Batalhão de Azov e liderado pelo extremista Setor de Direita. Poroshenko descreveu o assassinato como "tragédia" e disse que conhecia jornalista pessoalmente.

(O político russo assassinado Boris Nemtsov ao lado de Sheremet ao microfone.) 

Não é possível dizer quem encomendou a morte de Sheremet. Das informações disponíveis é possível levantar hipóteses. E muitas. Desde os batalhões pró-Ucrânia ao serviço secreto da Rússia, de algum membro do governo ucraniano ao governo da Bielorrússia, qualquer um desses grupos ou membros podem ter ligação com o assassinato. Jornalistas e opositores dos governos russo e bielorruso lamentaram a morte de Sheremet e lembraram sua proximidade com Nemtsov destacando o papel que ambos desempenharam ao revelar os esquemas de corrupção dos establishments destes países; outros compararam a morte do jornalista com o assassinato de Alexander Litvinenko pela FSB em Londres em 2006. Ambas as comparações dão a entender que Sheremet foi mais uma vítima dos governos dos países da antiga URSS. Apesar da suspeita do envolvimento russo, duas coisas precisam ser ditas: primeiro que tudo ainda é especulação, e o envolvimento da Rússia é apenas teoria. Segundo que, como anunciaram algumas autoridade ucranianas, o assassinato de Sheremet piora o clima político na Ucrânia e, por consequência, favorece Moscou que considera o governo de Kiev ilegítimo. O Ministério do Exterior russo denunciou estas análises como "russofóbicas".

(Relacionamento cada vez mais difícil.)

A renovação das sanções econômicas da União Europeia contra Moscou, a pressão interna de partidos e políticos aliados dos russos pela suspensão destas sanções, a nova estratégia da OTAN para com a Rússia com a alocação de tropas no leste, o combate na guerra de informações e uma maior aproximação da organização com a Escandinávia apontam para um aumento da tensão entre russos e ocidentais. No caso dos partidos aliados, a pressão dentro do bloco europeu fortalece a necessidade de uma reação à "guerra híbrida" promovida pelo Kremlin que envolve, além da disseminação de propaganda através da mídia, a rede de contatos com extremistas de direita e de esquerda.

Por outro lado a possibilidade (ainda que fortemente especulativa) de que a Rússia tenha alguma relação com o assassinato de Sheremet apenas contribui para o aumento da tensão política na região e uma maior instabilização da Ucrânia. Já o desconforto gerado pelo banimento dos atletas russos das Olimpíadas do Rio desmoraliza as autoridades do país ao expô-las ao mundo como profundamente corruptas e pouco confiáveis. Nos dois últimos casos os precedentes históricos de assassinatos de jornalistas no países da antiga URSS e os episódios de retaliações políticas em eventos esportivos contribuem para ou aumento da desconfiança generalizada em relação à Rússia.

O pedido do ministro russo Sergey Lavrov ao Secretário de Estado americano John Kerry para que o escândalo de doping não se transformasse em mais uma contenda política entre os dois lados é mais um sinal de que a lógica da realpolitik invadiu todos canais de contato entre a Rússia e os países do Ocidente. Cada acontecimento é equacionado dentro do quadro de problemas e discordâncias entre ambos. Todo o cuidado é pouco.

The reaction of the Eurasian movement to the military coup in Turkey

(Part of the population took to the streets against military coup: President Erdogan´s call seems to have taken effect.) 

As soon began the military coup in Turkey on July 15th, the think thank site Katehon, based on Eurasian thought and dedicated to political, geoestrategic and global geopolitical analysis, released some commentaries on the event.

The Katehon´s president is Konstantin Malofeev, oligarch described as the "Putin´s Soros" because his support to Kremlin´s projects. Maloffev is also in the UE and Canada sanction lists on charges of financing the conflict in Ukraine. The leading Katehon developer is Alexander Dugin, founder and ideologist of International Eurasian Movement.

I won´t make analysis here about the coup d´etat, but what Eurasianists thinks on it. It´s important to understand a little what they have to say given the influence on Russia´s political, economic and military elite.

According to the Katehon´s commentators, the main responsable for the military coup in Turkey would be the US. At first the site highlighted the President Recep Tayyip Erdogan´s accusation that who was behind the coup was a former allied, Fethullah Gülen. Gülen is intelectual and leader of an islamic religious group, and lives self-exiled in Penssylvania, US. For Katehon, he would be collaborating with American intelligence services, and the "Washington´s hand" would be the real political force behind the coup. The reason of this supposed American support would be in geopolitical reoriantation of Turkey, which in recent years has approached to Russia and announced, by it´s new Prime Minister on the coup´s eve, the reestablishment of relations with Syria. It would result in "collpase" of the US strategy in the region, which would have triggered it´s military contacts network in Turkey to initiate the action against Erdogan´s government.

(Fethullah Gülen: Erdogan´s ally in the past and accused of being behind the military coup in Turkey. He is accused by the President and the Eurasianist.)

When it became clear that military coup had failed, the site published text "Another US bloody mistake", in allusion to the American interference in other countries in the past. The commentary accused the putschist officers of "completely belong to the CIA-US based Gulen´s organization" (which calls "sect") and went straight to say that "this was a pro-American coup d´états organized by Gulen´s officers against the army, the government and the people". In addition there is no support of senior military officers, the people in the streets, conclamed by the President on TV, would be a demonstration that the coup didn´t have popular or state support. "This was only another faliure on the USA", the text says, which highlighted, once again, that Americans were disgusted with Turkey´s geopolitical reapprochment with it´s neighbours.

In another text the think thank comments on future geopolitical possibilities of Turkey. It says that from now on the country should be "distinctly Eurasian" with the resuption of it´s alliances regional policy with neighbors like Russia and Syria, the removal of a weakened pos-Brexit European Union and the thigthening of laws against coups in the future (which, according to the author, still come under US encouragement).

This Katehon´s approach isn´t surprising. Since 90´s of 20th century the Eurasian movement had created ties with politicians and intellectuals and published magazines and academic journals in Turkey. Dugin is the principal agent in the formation of these ties visiting the country several times. According Laruelle, the Eurasian thought approaches the old pan-Turkism, which in it´s origin sought the unification of the Turkic peoples in the same state. But the ideology was driven out of power even in 1923 by Ataturk´s nationalist government, and in the post-Cold War period was discredited by it´s association to far-right nationalist groups and lack of receptivity in Central Asian coutries. Thus, Eurasianism gives Turkey a new geopolitical vision and a less ideological approach in the country´s integration strategy in Eurasia. The Ankara´s approchment with Central Asian countries, whose peoples speak lenguages of Turkish origin, takes on a more "pragmatic" and "politically correct" tone instead the national and ideologized pan-Turkism bias.

(Russia and Turkey: for the Eurasian Movement and it´s intellectuals, people historically close that must establish an alliance in Eurasia against American unipolarity.)

According the researcher, since 2000´s Russia and Turkey have approached politically, economically and diplomatically with Russians trying to establish a strategic alliance formed by the two countries more Syria and Iran. The question is how this approach will be successful. Laruelle says:

"...the Russo-Turkish rapprochement, if pursued, is certain to change the basic situation in an important way: It will affect the very framework of relations of Moscow and of Ankara toward the European Union and NATO, as well as toward the Caucasus, where both countries might well seek to implement a logic of alliance and not one of competition." 

The failed coup d´état in Turkey left at least 165 dead, 1140 injuried and nearly 3000 were arrested. Another sources speak of up to 265 dead and over 1600 injuried.

According to Russian state new agency Sputnik, the Turkish Labor Minister, Süleyman Soylu, accused US of being behind the coup. True or not, it´s the same version of Katehon´s. Turkey asked for the extradition of Gülen, who, as expected, denied involvement in the coup. The question is how much this is true, or if the version of the events given by the official Russian press and Katehon are a new move of Kremlin and it´s allies given the commitment of it´s members to the Russian establishment.

* published in Portuguese on July 16th 2016.

A reação do movimento eurasiano ao golpe militar na Turquia

(Parte da população foi às ruas contra os militares golpistas: chamado do presidente Erdogan parece ter surtido efeito.)

Tão logo iniciou-se o golpe militar na Turquia no dia 15 de julho, o site do think thank Katehon, baseado no pensamento eurasiano e dedicado às análises políticas, geoestratégicas e geopolíticas globais, divulgou algumas análises sobre o evento.

O presidente do Katehon é Konstantin Malofeev, oligarca descrito como o "Soros de Putin" por seu apoio aos projetos do Kremlin.  Malofeev também consta na lista de sanções econômicas da UE e Canadá sob a acusação de financiar o conflito na Ucrânia. Já o principal colaborador do Katehon é Alexander Dugin, criador e ideólogo do Movimento Eurasiano Internacional.

Não farei aqui análises sobre o golpe, mas o que pensam os eurasianos a respeito. É significativo entender um pouco o que eles têm a dizer dada a influência que têm sobre a elite política, econômica e militar da Rússia.

Segundo os comentaristas, o principal responsável pelo golpe militar na Turquia seriam os EUA. Num primeiro momento o site destacou a acusação do presidente, Recep Taiyyp Erdogan, de que quem estaria por detrás do golpe era um ex-aliado seu, Fetullah Gülen. Gülen é intelectual e líder espiritual de um grupo religioso islâmico, e vive auto-exilado na Pensilvânia, EUA. Para o Katehon, ele estaria colaborando com os serviços de inteligências norte-americanos, e a "mão de Washington" seria a verdadeira força política por detrás do golpe. A razão deste suposto apoio americano estaria na reorientação geopolítica da Turquia, que nos últimos anos tem se aproximado da Rússia e anunciado, por meio de seu novo primeiro-ministro na véspera do golpe, o reestabelecimento das relações com a Síria. Isto resultaria no "colapso" da estratégia dos EUA na região, que teria acionado sua rede de contatos militares na Turquia para iniciar a ação contra o governo de Erdogan.

(Fethullah Güllen: aliado de Erdogan no passado e acusado de estar por detrás do golpe militar na Turquia. Acusado pelo presidente e pelos eurasianos.)

Quando ficou evidente que o golpe militar havia falhado, o site publicou o texto "Um outro erro sangrento dos EUA", numa alusão à interferência americana em outros países no passado. O comentário acusou os oficiais golpistas de "pertencerem completamente à organização de Gülen com sede nos EUA e na CIA" (a qual chama de "seita") e foi direto ao dizer que "este foi um golpe de Estado pró-americano organizado pelos oficiais de Gülen contra o exército, o governo e o povo". Além de não haver apoio dos altos oficiais militares, a população nas ruas, conclamadas pelo presidente pela televisão, seriam uma demonstração de que o golpe militar não tinha apoio popular ou estatal. "Este foi apenas mais um fracasso dos EUA", diz o texto, que destacou, mais uma vez, que os americanos estariam desgostosos com a reaproximação geopolítica da Turquia com seus vizinhos.

Noutro texto o think thank faz um comentário sobre as possibilidades geopolíticas futuras da Turquia. Diz que de agora em diante o país deverá ser "distintamente eurasiano" com a retomada de sua política regional de alianças com vizinhos como Rússia e Síria, o afastamento de uma enfraquecida União Europeia pós-Brexit e o endurecimento das leis contra futuros golpes de Estado (que, segundo o autor, ainda virão sob incentivo dos EUA).

Esta abordagem do Katehon não é surpreendente. Desde os anos 90 do século XX o movimento eurasiano tem criado laços com políticos e intelectuais e divulgado revistas e jornais acadêmicos na Turquia. Dugin é o principal agente na formação destes laços visitando o país diversas vezes. Segundo Laruelle, o pensamento eurasiano aproxima-se do antigo pan-turquismo, que na sua origem buscava a unificação dos povos turcos sob um mesmo Estado. Mas a ideologia foi alijada do poder ainda em 1923 pelo governo nacionalista de Ataturk, e no período pós-Guerra Fria estava desacreditado por sua associação com grupos nacionalistas de extrema-direita e pela falta de receptividade nos países da Ásia Central. Desta forma, o eurasianismo fornece à Turquia uma nova visão geopolítica e uma abordagem menos ideológica na estratégia de inserção do país na Eurásia. A aproximação de Ancara com os países da Ásia Central, cujas populações falam línguas de origem turca, ganha um tom mais "pragmático" e "politicamente correto" ao contrário do viés nacional e ideologizado do pan-turquismo.

(Rússia e Turquia: para o Movimento Eurasiano e seus intelectuais, povos historicamente próximos que devem estabelecer uma aliança na Eurásia contra a unipolaridade norte-americana.)

Segundo a pesquisadora, desde os anos 2000 Rússia e Turquia têm se aproximado política, econômica e diplomaticamente com os russos buscando estabelecer uma aliança estratégica formada pelos dois países mais Síria e Irã. A questão é saber o quanto esta aproximação será bem-sucedida. Diz Laruelle:

"...a reaproximação russo-turca, se continuada, está determinada em alterar a situação dada de um modo importante: ela afetará o próprio quadro de relações de Moscou e de Ancara com relação à União Europeia e à OTAN, bem como em direção ao Cáucaso, onde os dois países devem buscar uma lógica de aliança e não de disputa."

O golpe de Estado fracassado na Turquia deixou no mínimo 165 mortos, 1140 feridos e quase 3000 foram presos. Outras fontes falam em até 265 mortos e mais de 1600 feridos.

Segundo a agência estatal russa Sputnik, o ministro do trabalho turco, Süleyman Soylu, acusou os EUA de estarem por detrás do golpe. Verdade ou não, é a mesma versão do Katehon. A Turquia pediu a extradição de Gülen, que, como o esperado, negou participação no golpe. Resta saber o quanto isto é verdade, ou se a versão dos fatos dada pela imprensa oficial russa e o Katehon são uma nova jogada do Kremlin e seus aliados dado o comprometimento de seus membros com o establishment russo.